

Ref. 1186/INV/192/5/05
Roma, 30.06.2005

SAFETY RECOMMENDATION

Subject: Schleicher AS-K13 glider, registration marks I-ACRO (serial number 13195).
Serious incident occurred on 7.05.2005 in Guidonia Airport (Rome).

To: **EASA – European Aviation Safety Agency**
Executive Director – Mr Patrick Goudou
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c.c. **ENAC – Ente Nazionale per l'Aviazione Civile**
President - Prof. Vito Riggio
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On May 7, 2005, a Schleicher AS-K13 glider (registered in Italy as I-ACRO and operated by “Aero Club Roma”) experienced an undershoot landing in Guidonia airport (Rome), after the airbrakes were blocked up and completely extended due to the premature rupture of the upper part of the airbrakes lever (Figures 1, 2).

Visual and macroscopic examination of the broken lever showed that the rupture was caused by a spread crack, located near the connection holes (Figure 3). The fracture surfaces were undeformed and with granulous appearance (Figure 4, 5), with clear indication of a fatigue fracture.

Preliminary documentation analysis conducted by Agenzia Nazionale per la Sicurezza del volo (ANSV) showed that periodic inspections on the airbrakes lever are not covered in the applicable maintenance documentation. For the Schleicher AS-K13 only a manufacturer’s “Flight and Maintenance Manual” is available, which prescribe only an inspection on the bearing brackets and of the toggle force of the airbrakes control circuit.

Italian Civil Aviation Authority (ENAC) approved in 1998 a Bulletin prepared by “Aero Club Roma” (Norma di lavoro A.C.R. 342 dated 13.01.98) regarding 100/h inspection on the AS-

K13 glider. Such bulletin, however, does not require any non invasive airbrakes lever inspection, as well as on the flight control system.

Therefore, ANSV recommends that European Aviation Safety Agency:

- Require Schleicher AS-K13 manufacturer to revise glider maintenance manual, in order to introduce non invasive inspections of the airbrakes lever and, more specifically, on the flight control system components (**In reply refer to: ANSV-3/192-05/1/I/05**);
- Consider the possibility to require an AS-K13 fleet “*ad hoc*” inspection on the airbrakes lever to all operators (**In reply refer to: ANSV-4/192-05/2/I/05**).

Prof. Bruno Franchi
President ANSV



Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 3



Figure 4



Figure 5